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that there are other methods of contesting attachments. B should
have informed the bank of the true ownership of the money and
then the bank could have defended against the garnishment or
could have interpleaded A and X.
W. A. K.

NEGLIGENcE-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROXIMATE CAUSE AND CON-

DITION.-Action by house owners against heating contractors for
fire damage allegedly resulting from improper installation of coal
furnace in house. Evidence revealed that one of owners had built
a fire in the furnace, knowing that thermostats controlling the
drafts were not working. T-iial court set aside verdict for plaintiffs,
ordered new trial, and plaintiffs brought error. Held, reversing
judgment, that plaintiffs' act was only a remote cause of the fire
and merely created a condition under which the fire which destroyed
the house was started. Reese v. Lowry, 86 S.E.2d 391 (W. Va. 1955).
In primary support of this holding in the principal case, the
court cited Webb. v. Sessler, 135 W. Va. 341, 63 S.E.2d 65 (1950).
That case was an action for injuries received as a result of an automobile being struck by a negligently operated airplane which was
attempting to land on an airport which, in violation of Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations, was situated too closely to the highway upon which the automobile was parked. In that case the
court also distinguished between the proximate cause of an injury
and the condition or occasion of the injury and found the antecedent
negligence of the owners, lessees, and operators of the airport to
constitute the condition upon which the intervening or postcedent
negligence of the airplane operator acted to proximately cause the
injury for which only the airplane operator was liable. However,
in the principal case ".....
notwithstanding no injury would have
occurred if it had not happened. . .

.",

the postcedent or intervening

act of the plaintiff was held to be the condition. In both the Webb
case, supra, and the principal case the court made the statement
that there is a clear distinction in West Virginia beween the proximate cause of an injury -and the condition or occasion of the injury.
In Snyder v. PhiladelphiaCo., 54 W. Va. 149, 46 S.E. 366 (1903),
a teamster's horses became frightened by the negligent blowing off
of a gas well, and in the teamster's attempt to contr6l them, a line
broke, as a result of which he fell from his wagon, and was injured.
The court, in affirming judgment for the plaintiff, held that the
weak condition of the line could not be regarded as the cause of
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the injury, even conceding that the fall was the result of the breaking of the line. In that case the blowing off of the well was held
to be the superior or controlling agency and the proximate cause
as contradistinguished from those causes which were merely incidental or subsidiary to such controlling cause. The court said,
"Where the alleged intervening cause is in reality only a condition upon or through which the negligent act operated to produce
the injuries complained of, the defendant will be held liable."
Id. at 158, 46 S.E. at 469. It is seen here, as in the Webb case, supra,
that the condition was one existing at the time of defendant's
negligence; a more or less occasion for injury or mishap; a condition or situation involving some danger within itself. And, although occupying a different position in the sequence of events
as to the time of occurrence from that in the principal case, the
condition was one resulting from the plaintiff's own acts.
However, when a defendant railroad pushed a coal car upon a
siding which was in an unsafe condition and the coal car rolled
through the siding and into a river, destroying plaintiff's barge, the
court, in affirming judgment for plaintiff in an action to recover
damages for the loss of the barge, held that the neglect of the
owners of the siding in failing to keep it in safe condition was not
an intervening act of a responsible party and did not break the
causal connection of defendant's antecedent negligence. Further,
the fact that such antecedent negligence might have been the
remote cause of the loss was ". .. altogether immaterial." Fawcett
v. Railway Co., 24 W. Va. 755 (1884). And in a later case, in a
situation substantially the same as the Fawcett case, supra, the
court said, "While the negligent act of one person may, as a natural
consequence, cause injury to another; yet if before the injury
results, the negligent act of a third person intervenes and produces
the injury, the latter alone is responsible therefor, though but for
the first negligent act the injury could not have occurred." Anderson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 74 W. Va. 17, 21, 81 S.E. 579, 581
(1914). In those two cases, the court speaks in terms of "intervening acts" as either breaking or failing to break the causal connection
between the injury and the antecedent negligent act rather than
using the term "condition", which, in view of the situations, could
easily have been applied and would have resulted in the same
decision.
And compare Carricov. West Virginia Cent. &P. Ry., 39 W. Va.
86, 19 S.E. 571 (1894). There, plaintiff, a passenger of defendant
railroad, was injured by collision of the coach in which he was rid-
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ing against a pile of rocks negligently left too near the track by
defendant, while plaintiff was riding with his arm either protruding
from a window, resting on the sill, or entirely inside the coach. The
court there intimated that plaintiff could not have recovered had
he been proven negligent. But in the principal case the court
admits the injury would not have occurred in the absence of plaintiff's acts. So, despite an absolutely causal character, plaintiff's acts
still do not preclude recovery.
A review of these cases would seem to suggest that our court
uses the word "condition" in two ways: First, to describe an act
which is intervening in the literal sense only, in that it is an act
which despite its occurrence between an antecedent negligent act
and the injury, does not become the "proximate", "efficient", or
"immediate" cause thereof. Given legal interpretation the word
"intervening" as used by our court seems to mean "superseding",
in that when an act is determined to be intervening it supersedes
the original negligence and becomes the proximate cause of an
injury. See Webb v. Sessler, supra; Snyder v. Philadelphia Co.,
supra; Wilson v. Edwards, 77 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1953); Hartley
v. Crede, 82 S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1954). Conversely, when the
intervening force or act is of such nature as constitutes the "proximate", "efficient!', or "immediate' cause of the injury, the antecedent negligent act is merely a condition or occasion. The
doctrine of intervening efficient cause where applicable, eliminates
the prior act of negligence as a proximate cause and establishes
it in the nature of an occasion or condition. Steward v. Minneapolis
St. Ry., 222 Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221 (1946). Second: The use of
the words "condition" or "occasion" by our court would appear
also to describe conduct of a contributorily negligent, or at least
questionable, character, which, despite such character, is not the
"proximate" cause of plaintiff's injury. And when used in these
two ways, it also appears to be of little consequence whether the
condition or occasion was an act or situation which was antecedent
to, and upon which the intervening or postcedent negligence acted
to proximately cause the injury, or vice versa. Similarly it would
seem to be immaterial whether the condition or occasion results
from the acts, or is the act, of either, the plaintiff, the defendant, or
an independent third person.
All this is not to quarrel with the result reached by the court
in the principal case, but an attempt to ascertain its value as
precedent. Certainly there is a distinction in this jurisdiction
between a condition or occasion for an injury and the proximate
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cause of an injury. But the distinction is that of result or legal
liability. The thought suggested by a review of the cases and
particularly the principal case is that perhaps the problem of
distinction is one of undue emphasis, resulting from explaining
acts which although definitely of a causative nature, when viewed
together with all the facts, are not the proximate cause of an
injury. This thought is strengthened by the fact that a problem,
and apparently confusion, also exists in other jurisdictions as to
the importance of a condition or occasion of an injury. Stewart v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., supra, shows how the Minnesota court is
approaching the problem and at least one other court is even
more definite.
In Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940),
the court rather tersely remarked that a statement that an act or
omission is a "condition" and not a cause of an injury means no
more than that it is not a "proximate cause" of that injury.
C. S. McG.

PLEADING AND

PRACTICE-WRIT

OF ERROR-SPECIAL BILL OF

EXCEPTIONs-SPECIFICATION OF ERROR.-During a homicide trial D
was asked and required to answer a question on cross examination
over the objection of D's counsel. A motion for mistrial was overruled by the trial court and an exception taken. A writ of error
to the circuit court was refused on the basis that the alleged error
had not been specifically made a ground in support of D's motion
for a new trial or incorporated in a special bill of exceptions. Held,
that the court may and should consider alleged errors arising on
the rulings of a trial court in the admission or rejection of evidence
objected to, where alleged errors in the admission or rejection of
evidence, to which objection has been made in the trial court, are
specifically set forth as ground of a motion to set aside a verdict
and grant a new trial; or incorporated in a special bill of exceptions;
or are incorporated in the assignments of errors contained in the
petition for writ of error; or set forth in the brief of counsel; or
otherwise specifically brought to the attention of the trial court.
State v. Bragg, 87 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1955) (3-2 decision).
The court has been confronted with two conflicting lines' of
decision on the question of consideration of error arising on rulings
of the trial court. One line of reasoning is that found in Gregory's
Adm'r v. Ohio River R.R., 37 W. Va. 606, 16 S.E. 819 (1893),
that, "objections and exceptions to the admission or rejection of
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